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of the WTO and means to improve its efficiency. The author summarizes the Board’s key
findings and reflects on its main recommendations. The Board discusses sovereignty and
globalization in thecontextof theworld trading system. Inaddition itfinds that theWTOneeds
to reconsider its institutional framework and some concepts underlying the organization.
The Board particularly urges the WTO to address the erosion of the most-favoured-nation
treatment through the proliferation of the preferential trade agreements. Transparency and
civil society, dispute settlement, decision-making, efficiency, and the role of the Director-
General and the secretariat are also discussed. The author concludes that the Board focuses
on economic consequences of trade liberalization but fails to address the harmful effects of
globalization. He agrees with the Board that institutional reform is required, but concludes
that it would have been helpful if the Board had offered clearer direction on how to improve
the decision-making process.
Keywords
globalization; international economic law; international trade; Sutherland Report; World
Trade Organization
In early 2005 aConsultativeBoard to theWorldTradeOrganization (WTO)Director-
General presented its report1 on the functioning of theWTO andmeans to improve
its efficiency. In his Foreword the Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, says
that the tenth anniversary of theWTO is an appropriate moment for reflection and
renewed commitment. The report comes at a timely moment for another reason:
recent ministerial conferences have ended in acrimony and overall progress in the
Doha Development Agenda2 has decelerated.
The board was chaired by former Director-General Peter Sutherland and was
composed of scholars, practitioners, and representatives of the business com-
munity.3 Its report – the Sutherland Report – follows two tracks. First, it re-
views fundamental concepts of international law and policy that need clarific-
ation in the context of the WTO. The perceived perils of globalization and the
need to safeguard sovereignty, traditionally put forward by critics, are obvious
themes. Second, the report emphasizes that progress is required in the fields of the
* Associate Professor of International Law, Vrije Universiteit (Free University) Amsterdam.
1. The Future of the WTO – Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, Report by the
Consultative Board to theDirector-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, XII–2004 (hereafter Sutherland Report).
2. Declaration and Work Programme of the Ministerial Conference at Doha, WT/Min/(01)/DEC/1 of
20 November 2001.
3. The members were Peter Sutherland, Jagdish Bhagwati, Kwesi Botchwey, Niall FitzGerald, Koichi Hamada,
John H. Jackson, Celso Lafer, and Thierry deMontbrial.
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decision-making process, dispute settlement, and co-ordinationwith other relevant
intergovernmental organizations. In addition, some improvements in the participa-
tionofnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs) intheWTOrule-makingprocessare
suggested.
Chapter I discusses globalization, poverty, and environmental issues, concerns
that are particularly raised byNGOs. The report holds that liberalizing international
trade will benefit members, but care must be taken to create safety nets. Chapter II
explains the erosion of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, a process that
weakens a non-discriminatory world trading system. In Chapter III the report ex-
plains how the WTO may restrict the exercise of sovereignty, a development that
hasworriedmanyWTOmembers. The examination of coherence and co-ordination
with intergovernmental organizations – ‘horizontal co-ordination’ – in Chapter IV
is an attempt to elevate the WTO to the same footing as the IMF and the World
Bank, while Chapters V–IX elaborate on transparency and civil society, dispute set-
tlement, decision-making, efficiency, and the role of the Director-General and the
secretariat. This article summarizes the key findings in the report and reflects on its
main recommendations.
1. GLOBALIZATION, SOVEREIGNTY, TRANSPARENCY AND CIVIL
SOCIETY
The report takes a defensive position by explaining that globalization and an open
trading system are not a threat, but on the contrary will produce more prosperity.
It offers questions and produces answers whichwould fit in a pamphlet celebrating
the achievements of free trade. Is open trade a threat to human rights? Does it harm
the interests of the poor?Does theWTOcause a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of trade
standards? Can trade and environmental protection coexist? The report pretends to
have the answers, although it acknowledges that safeguards are necessary to reverse
damaging consequences. The bottom line is that free trade prevails, provided that
adequate safeguards are in place.
The report addresses the concern that sovereignty is eroded under the WTO
system. This issue came up when states were forced to accept decisions of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) on environmental protection and food
safety. The report holds that international lawboth creates and restricts sovereignty,
butreassures that ‘it is still recognizedthat thestate is still central to thecurrent inter-
national lawstructure’.4 On theotherhand sovereigntymustbe constrained inorder
to facilitate action at an international level; cross-border environmental protection
ormanagement of the global commons are obvious concerns that require concerted
action. The report even presents the argument that globalization is inescapable
and, consequently, international institutions are needed to control international
processes, whether we like it or not. Still, the report maintains that sovereignty
4. Sutherland Report, supra note 1, para. 113.
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continues to play a role:
In committing to theWTOand its procedures and disciplines, governments are return-
ing to themselves a degree of ‘sovereignty’ lost through the process of globalization.
If governments are losing the capacity to regulate meaningfully at the domestic level,
they are reclaiming some control of their economic destinies at themultilateral level.5
Transparency anddialoguewith civil society are discussed inChapterV. Through
its policy on de-restriction of documents and its outstanding website, the WTO
communicates with the outside world. More direct communications with civil so-
ciety have been developed at a rapid pace. Currently the WTO is one of the few
organizations that provides in its constitution (Article V.2) the right ofNGOs to con-
sult. The report acknowledges that NGOs have played an effective role in ‘building
caucuses and in influencing governments to shift positions and strengthening their
commitments to agreed rules’.6 This is particularly true for NGOs close to decision-
making centres in Brussels andWashington. But there are caveats. First, someNGOs
are not well informed and do not offer constructive advice. Second, there is a risk
that excessive involvement of NGOs complicates negotiations. The report says that
negotiations must be restricted to government level and that opening up paral-
lel tracks through which NGOs tend to operate is counterproductive. Third, many
NGOs themselves lack transparency.Whomdo they represent,who funds them, and
what is their agenda? Fourth, the report points at limitations in NGO involvement.
It argues that trade diplomacy ‘requires some level of confidentiality’, and NGOs
cannot be fully involved in the negotiating process. ‘Therefore, civil society is likely
to be frustrated by being left out of the deal making’.7 The report seems to imply
that frustration may easily turn into resentment against whatever the outcome of
negotiations is.
2. DECISION-MAKING AND EFFICIENCY
An overarching theme is the lack of progress in the current Doha round. Several
reasons are identified. First, WTO membership has almost doubled since the start
of the Uruguay Round in 1986 and is no longer dominated by developed countries
that have a matching agenda. Developing countries, becoming more assertive and
understanding the issues at stake, knowhow toplay the gameof trade diplomacy. By
the use of training and technical assistance offered by the WTO and the assistance
of consultancy services, developing countries have gained an upgraded negotiating
power.8 NGOs control funds and offer technical facilities to assist developing coun-
tries in trade diplomacy. At political level NGOs encourage developing countries to
resist compromises that do not take into account their interests.
A second reason refers to the requirement of consensus in the legislative process.
In theWTO ‘consensus diplomacy is predominant and almost exclusive’.9 Article IX
5. Ibid., para. 140.
6. Ibid., para. 194.
7. Ibid., para. 200.
8. Ibid., para. 274.
9. Consensus is reached if no member present at the meeting when the decision is taken formally objects
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of the Agreement Establishing the WTO stipulates that WTO bodies10 shall decide
by consensus, and accepts majority decision-making as a second option only.11 In
practice WTO members are reluctant to decide by majority and the report also
believes that this is undesirable. The avoidance of voting can be explained by the
fact that the systemof one state–one vote does not reflect the economic reality of the
world trading system. It would be quite unacceptable that the major industrialized
countries would be outvoted when important decisions are being taken.12
The report acknowledges that progress can be frustrated by legislative activities,
but holds that departing from consensus is objectionable because it undermines
negotiating strategies or would force members to accept obligations which they
cannot possibly meet.13 The report offers some remedies by proposing distinctions
betweentypesofdecisionsandrequiringmemberstoinvokea ‘vitalnational interest’
when they block a decision requiring consensus. However, decision-making in a
meeting with most WTO delegates present, each possessing the power of veto,
will continue to be an arduous process. The report suggests the development of a
constituency structure based on the representation of regional trade agreements
and other regional groups. This probably implies that groups ofWTOmemberswill
have to speak with a single voice. The report does not elaborate on this important
proposal, but advises the Director-General to explore the potential for increased
co-ordination and group representation.
Theinertiacausedbyconsensusdiplomacyisadirectthreattothepoliticalprocess
onwhichanewtradeagendadepends.Thereportexpresses thebelief that theprocess
can gainmomentum throughmore frequentministerial conferences. These should
be carefully prepared by a consultative body of senior officials. Efficiency could be
improved by creating closer bonds between the WTO secretariat and ministerial
conferences. In thefinal chapter the report pleads for amore activeWTOsecretariat,
offering more intellectual input, and a stronger presence in trade negotiations of
the WTO, which should have ‘a convincing and persistent institutional voice of
its own’.14 For that matter, only technical competences and appropriate experience
should be decisive criteria for the appointment of a Director-General.
3. THE EROSION OF MFN STATUS: PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
TheWTOas a global institution operates in a dynamic environment. As the volume
of international trade increases and creates more incentives for, and threats to,
to the proposed decision. Absence or abstention does not prevent consensus. See T. Cottier and M. Oesch,
International Trade Regulation (2005), 101.
10. The main WTO organs are plenary bodies, i.e. the Ministerial Conference and General Council are both
composed of representatives of all the members.
11. When formal voting takes place, eachWTOmember has one vote. Examples of decisions are interpretations
of theWTOAgreementor theMultilateral TradeAgreements, proposals for amendmentof these agreements,
a waiver of an obligation imposed on amember, or the accession of newmembers.
12. Cottier and Oesch, supra note 9, at 103.
13. Sutherland Report, supra note 1, para. 287.
14. Ibid., para. 361.
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domestic economies, theWTO should respond to such changes. Environmental and
health concerns, human rights, and security demandsmay affect trade relations and
must be addressed by theWTO. Other trade-related aspects cannot be ignored. The
2001 Doha Work Programme set up working groups that were assigned to address
investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.
Hitherto, progress on these issues has been negligible and has frustrated members
that want tomove forward. In the report (other)members are blamed for the lack of
interest. ‘Despite assurances to the contrary, ministers often devote farmore time to
bilateral and regional trade deals than to ensuring the multilateral system delivers
worldwide results’.15 The report concludes that the WTO as a platform for trade
negotiations has become less attractive because progress is slow and unpredictable.
A logical response to the frustration of members is the search for ‘trade relation-
ships that are broader and deeper than is easily achievable on a global scale’.16 This
resulted in the creation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between groups of
WTOmembers. A typical PTA is a trade agreement between two or more members
mutuallyoffering special (andusuallybetter) tradepreferences thanunder theWTO
commitments. Themotive for agreements of this kind is the desire to create political
bonds or to intensify regional integration.
PTAs are prima facie a violation of the non-discrimination clause expressed as
theMFN clauses under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).17 However, the WTO allows the
existence and creation of PTAs subject to certain conditions. Article XXIV of GATT
exempts fromMFNobligationsmembers that create or have created a PTA, provided
that it covers ‘substantially all the trade’. A similar provision appears in Article V of
the GATS. Initially drafters believed that Article XXIV of GATT would be invoked
occasionally for a limited number of PTAs only. The reality was that since the
establishment of the WTO this provision has hardly had a disciplinary effect and
caused an ‘explosion’ of PTAs in which virtually allWTOmembers participate.18
The report speaks disconcertingly about the proliferation of PTAs. The ‘spaghetti
bowl’ of PTAs (customs unions, common markets, regional and bilateral free trade
areas, or whatever name is given to an arrangement) now comprises more than 300
and has substantially reduced the significance of MFN status. The report comes to
a remarkable conclusion: ‘The reality today is that the WTO presides over a world
trading system that is far from the vision of the architects of GATT. This is best
illustrated by reference to the EU, which now has its MFN tariffs fully applicable
15. Ibid., para. 316.
16. Ibid., para. 62.
17. These provisions stipulate thatWTOmembersmust immediately and unconditionally accord treatment no
less favourable than the treatment which they accord to like products/services of any other member.
18. The website of theWTO reports that ‘By July 2003, only threeWTOmembers –Macau China, Mongolia and
Chinese Taipei – were not party to a regional trade agreement. The surge in these agreements has continued
unabated since the early 1990s. By May 2003, over 265 had been notified to the WTO (and its predecessor,
GATT). Of these, 138 were notified after the WTO was created in January 1995. Over 190 are currently
in force; another 60 are believed to be operational although not yet notified. Judging by the number of
agreements reportedly planned or already under negotiation, the total number of regional trade agreements
in forcemightwell approach300by2005.’ (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/bey1 e.htm
(accessed 10 April 2005).
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in only nine trading partners, albeit including the US and Japan’.19 After putting
forward some considerations on economic theory the report concludes that PTAs
have advantages and disadvantages for the world trading system. The bottom line
is inconclusive: PTAs may be ‘building blocks’ or ‘stumbling blocks’. The process of
‘competitive liberalization’ is constructive and suggests that PTAs will be followed
by further liberalization on a global scale and, accordingly, will advance the object-
ives of the WTO in the long run. On the other hand ‘the unregulated proliferation
of PTAs tends to create vested interests that make it more difficult to attain mean-
ingful multilateral liberalization . . . [these interests] undermine transparency and
predictability in international trade relations’.20
The report suggests two means of combating the proliferation of PTAs. First, a
substantial breakdown of WTO tariffs and non-tariff measures could render many
PTAs futile and effectively promote MFN status; when aWTO tariff is close to zero
then a PTA could hardly bring greater trade benefits. This presupposes awillingness
ofWTOmembers rigorously to break down tariff and non-tariff barriers. The report
acknowledges that there is little reason to believe that on this point progress will
be made. It also points at an inherent opposition to driving back the number of
PTAs: members benefiting from special trade arrangements will resist giving up
their position and yielding to the general non-discrimination clauses of the WTO.
A second suggestion is the review of all PTAs against a restrictive interpretation
of Article XXIV. The result could be a ‘shake-out’ of all PTAs unable to meet the
threshold of the ‘substantially all the trade’ clause.
4. THE EROSION OF MFN STATUS: THE ENABLING CLAUSE
A second category of special trade benefits that constitute a prima facie violation
of MFN status follows from the provisions on special and differential treatment of
developing members. The General System of Tariff Preferences (GSP) was incorpor-
ated intoGATT in the1970s, becauseparties thenbelieved that developing countries
should be treatedwith special care, considering the economic consequences of trade
liberalization. The enabling clause, creating the legal framework for the GSP, has
given the GSP a permanent place in theWTO. Like a PTA, it creates an exception to
MFN treatment. It allows for ‘discriminatory’ trade benefits which are ‘generalized,
non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory . . . to the developing countries’.21 The term
‘non-discriminatory’ implies that identical tariff treatment must be available to all
GSP beneficiaries with a comparable ‘development, financial [or] trade need’.22
Thereportdoubtstheeconomicrationaleof theenablingclausebecauseitappears
to have little effect on the beneficiaries. There is also reason to distrust the motive
behind the granting of preferences by developed countries, because political rather
19. Sutherland Report, supra note 1, para. 74.
20. Ibid., para. 84.
21. See footnote 3 of paragraph 2(a) of the enabling clause.
22. ThiswasclarifiedinEuropeanCommunities–Conditions for theGrantingofTariffPreferences toDeveloping
Countries. Report of the Appellate Body AB-2004-1.
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thanbenevolenteconomicmotivescanliebehindpreferential treatment.TheUnited
States and the EuropeanUnion offer special and differential treatment to their allies
in exchange for political subservience. Another aspect is the ‘variable approach’ to
special and differential treatment. The report notes that in the case of a conflict
arising between the grantor and the grantee preferential treatment may be ceased
instantly. In the final analysis the interests of developed countries appear to prevail
over those of developing countries. The report therefore proposes an acceleration in
the process of graduation through which more developing countries give up their
special status and accept the mainstream obligations ofWTO.
5. VARIABLE GEOMETRY
The report puts its finger on a soft spot. PTAs and the enabling clause are open-ended
arrangements; the number of arrangements is virtually unlimited23 and the ‘degree
of preferences’ cannot be managed by theWTO.24 The report strikes an ambiguous
attitudewhen it reflects on PTAs. It seems to turn against a further proliferation, but
it also recognizes that theWTOmay not be fully able tomeetmembers’ aspirations.
‘There are advantages to some amount of variation in obligations to avoid the “one
sizefitsall”problems, and toprovideopportunities forexperimentation, innovation,
and measures that have policy value, but which cannot be achieved in the context
of so manyMembers’.25
To a large degree PTAs demonstrate that this opportunity has already been
taken: PTAs bring variation. In the context of creating a ‘results-oriented institu-
tion’ the report attempts to bring special trade arrangements firmly within the
ambit of the WTO. The WTO should not passively wait and see how PTAs sur-
face, but should create a supervisory framework within which the WTO over-
sees a system of variation. Accordingly, the report proposes a ‘variable geometry’,
meaning that obligations under the WTO may differ for different members de-
pending on the pace at which they want to promote trade liberalization. In this
way the WTO takes effective command over a system of variable trade commit-
ments. The report notes that the WTO has some experience in variable geometry
through plurilateral agreements that members could accept voluntarily.26 ‘Tak-
ing the plurilateral route again would permit willing groups of members to take
commitments on specific dossiers where no agreement of meaningful substance is
likely’.27
23. In theory, when each of the 148WTOmembers concluded a bilateral trade agreementwith anothermember
the sum of agreements would be 147 + 146 + 145 . . . ; the result would be close to 10,000. This count leaves
out multilateral agreements. In addition, trade benefits created under a PTA or the enabling clause are not
limited in any way.
24. However, it should be kept inmind that under Art. XXIV para. 5, GATT customs unions and free trade areas –
the most common PTAs – cannot introduce duties and other regulations of commerce higher or more
restrictive than existing commitments under theWTO. Thismeans that existing trade commitments cannot
be affected by PTAs.
25. Sutherland Report, supra note 1, para. 293.
26. Agreement on Government Procurement and Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, April 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 4.
27. Sutherland Report, supra note 1, para. 296.
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While accepting this option the report rejects the ‘divisive approach that would
enshrine a multiclass membership structure’.28 Having said this, the realities of
international trade diplomacy cannot be ignored. In the report a preference for a
system in which trade liberalization with multiple speeds is developed under the
WTO umbrella is clearly indicated. When a selected number ofWTOmembers are
enabled to move ahead, this
may dissuade the most powerful Members of the WTO from taking alternative
routes in securing – or avoiding – trade liberalization with their trading partners.
In particular it might diminish the attraction of regional and bilateral trade arrange-
ments, especially those that fail to come close to the requirements laid down in the
WTO.29
In other words the report favours amulti-speedWTO in order to suppress a craving
for PTAs. Accordingly, the report recommends that plurilateral approaches toWTO
negotiations should be examined.
The report presents the GATS scheduling approach as a second option offering
morevariation in tradecommitments.This implies that tradecommitments (includ-
ing market access) will be negotiated for each member individually. A GATS-like
systemmeans that the level of liberalizationmayvary for eachmember; thenumber
of liberalization levels could be equal to the number of members. It is unclear how
this could work for trade in goods. It could even be seen as a step back because
the GATS does not automatically offer market access as was the case with GATT. It
wouldalsomake theGATTless transparent.This is also recognizedby the report: ‘the
multiplicity of individual national commitments can be a complication for traders
and investors that are active on a global scale’.30 This is an understatement.
6. HORIZONTAL CO-OPERATION
TheWTOisclosely related to theBrettonWoods institutions.The IMFandtheWorld
Bank respectively give as their purposes ‘to facilitate the expansion and balanced
growthof international trade’ and ‘to promote the long-range balanced growthof in-
ternational trade’.31 These institutions share a common purpose – to facilitate or
promote international trade. Thedegree of co-operation is, however, limited to some
formal arrangements ondata exchange andmutual representation. In general, inter-
national economic institutions appear tohave anatural tendency to fendoff outside
interference in their jurisdictional territory. The IMF is a notorious example of this
parochialism. It has persistently rejected international norms and standards other
than those required tomeet its own objectives. Accordingly, the IMF’s legal counsel
has argued that human rights are not binding on the IMF because it is not party to
28. Ibid., para. 298.
29. Ibid., paras. 298–299.
30. Ibid., para. 302.
31. Art. I of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF andWorld Bank.
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any human rights treaty and the IMF Articles of Agreement do not refer to human
rights.32
The report explains that the WTO is becoming more responsive in considering
norms and rules beyond its own constitutive documents. It points out that Article V
oftheWTOAgreementempowerstheGeneralCouncil to ‘makeappropriatearrange-
ments for effective co-operation’ with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that
have related responsibilities. Adjectives such as ‘appropriate’ and ‘effective’ indic-
ate that co-operation must be more than just a formal arrangement. Exchange of
information between IGOs and the incorporation of legal norms developed outside
theWTOframework should create a rationalized system for international economic
co-operation.Accordingly, theWTOdispute settlement bodies have applied exogen-
ous rules and standards, including multilateral environmental treaties, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and standards developed by the United Nations,
theWorld IntellectualPropertyOrganization (WIPO)andother internationalorgan-
izations. These standards and rulesmayenter theWTOlegal systemthroughvarious
‘doors’. The reference to ‘sustainable development’ in theWTOPreamble has helped
the Appellate Body to balance environmental conservation concerns against WTO
commitments. Another development is the establishment of co-operative arrange-
ments such as the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF), supporting
projects for the development and implementation of standards on food safety and
plant and animal life.33
A close partner for co-operation is the IMF. The WTO and the IMF are com-
plementary institutions in the sense that the WTO liberalizes trade and the IMF
liberalizes current payments. More particularly, the IMF paves the way towards
trade liberalization by promoting a stable monetary system. The report notes that
under GATT the IMF took a rather dominant position towards trade issues, but the
WTO had remedied this:
the idea was not to have the WTO adjusting in a subordinate manner to the policies
of the IMF and the World Bank but for the WTO to insert through ‘horizontal co-
ordination’ its agenda in those of the two powerful and long-established intergovern-
mental organizations.34
These words reveal the desire to be treated equally.
While exploring common grounds for horizontal co-operation, the report at-
tempts to set some firm limits:
the dispute settlement system of theWTO, due to its special characteristics and being
self-contained in its jurisdictional responsibilities, offersno legal space forco-operation
32. But see F. Gianviti, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the IMF’, address at the Seminar on Current
Developments inMonetary and Fiscal Law,WashingtonDC,May 7–17, 2002. Prof. Gianviti is the IMF’s legal
counsel. http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/gianv3.pdf (accessed 15 April 2005).
33. TheSTDFassistsdevelopingcountries inenhancing their expertise andcapacity toanalyseand to implement
international sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards. The Facility was established by the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the World Bank, the
World Health Organization (WHO), and theWTO. See http://www.standardsfacility.org/.
34. Sutherland Report, supra note 1, para. 161.
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with other international organizations except on a case-by-case basis derived from the
right of panels to seek information.35
In the same vein, the report continues, this applies to lawmaking and standard-
setting. WTO law is lex specialis and ‘cannot be changed from the outside by other
international organizations that have different membership and different rules
regarding the creation of rules’. This echoes the legalistic and narrow approach
adopted by the BrettonWoods institutions.
7. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
A major achievement of the WTO is the mandatory dispute settlement system,
which has resulted in dozens of cases being decided by theDispute Settlement Body.
A typicalWTO case goes through a number of phases. First, parties attempt to settle
theirdisputebydiplomaticmeans.Second, shouldthis fail, theaggrievedpartiesmay
request the establishment of a panelwhichwill adopt a report on the dispute. Third,
parties may appeal against a panel report before the Appellate Body. The Dispute
Settlement Body will adopt reports of the panel and the Appellate Body, unless it
decides by consensus not to adopt it. The Dispute Settlement Understanding also
provides for rules that give the winning party a right to challenge the adequacy of
measures taken by the losing party.
The dispute settlement system has gained a formidable reputation since the es-
tablishment of the WTO. Not only does it offer satisfaction to members harmed
by trade actions, it also clarifies trade law and its relation to general international
law. In the Shrimp case the Appellate Body even urged WTO members to negotiate
an environmental treaty before quantitative restrictions for environmental reasons
could be introduced. The environment celebrated a stealthy victory when the Ap-
pellate Body considered that the principle of sustainable development ‘adds colour,
texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO
Agreement’.36 The report articulates that this is an area that the jurisprudence will
need to develop further.37 Decisions of panels and appellate bodies are clear and co-
herent, and generally provide detailed reasoning. The report finds that ‘there exists
much satisfaction’ with the dispute settlement system, and cautions that further
experience is needed before any dramatic changes can be undertaken. It is hard not
to concur with this.
But there is also criticism. The dispute settlement bodies are accused of judicial
activism. This is a logical consequence of the failure of WTO members to reach
agreement on unambiguous texts. Panels and appellate bodies are not allowed to
declare a non liquet andmust sometimes dig deep to find the law.Members have also
argued that the dispute settlement bodies ignored the delicate balance of politics
and law.Traditionally, tradedisputeshavebeen resolvedbydiplomaticmeans rather
35. Ibid., para. 167.
36. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998,
para. 153.
37. Sutherland Report, supra note 1, para. 236.
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than by litigation, and in some disputes amember favoured a political compromise.
The report rejects this argument and strongly opposes ‘any political or diplomatic
activity to interfere with the basic result so carefully arrived at by the relatively
intense dispute settlement procedures’.38 Problems also lie in compliance with
decisions. The report suggests some remedies.When a losing party in a dispute fails
to comply with a decision, the fallback position of the winning party is usually
the ‘suspension of obligations’ or ‘retaliation’.39 This means that it is legitimate
undercurrentWTOrules to take trade-restrictivecountermeasureswhichobviously
frustrate the objectives of theWTO.
An alternative would be a system bywhich the losing partymust offermonetary
compensation, thereby preserving existing trade commitments. The report warns,
however, that monetary compensation may only be ‘a temporary fallback position
pending full compliance, otherwise the “buy out” problemwill occur’.40 The report
acknowledges that in the final analysis effective compliance ‘really [depends] . . . on
the general attitudes of WTO Members, particularly the very large and powerful
among them. Those attitudes reflect a willingness – or lack of it – to support the
credibility and fair operation of the dispute settlement system’.41 In plain language,
the report asksmembers to be law-abiding. Although a ‘general sense of satisfaction
with the dispute settlement system’ exists, more ideas for reforms have been pro-
posed. These are procedural or of minor importance for the overall procedure and
include an opportunity for the Appellate Body to remand a case for reconsideration
by the panel, the right of NGOs to have amicus briefs accepted and considered by the
dispute settlement bodies, and making dispute settlement procedures accessible to
the public. Openness and transparencywill benefit theWTO and the standing of its
dispute settlement procedure.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the report concerns are voiced that have been expressed by free trade advoc-
ates, WTO members, and civil society or NGOs. The non-discriminatory nature of
the WTO has been undermined, members fear loss of sovereignty, and civil soci-
ety wants to be heard when the rules are set. Institutional improvements focus on
a more streamlined dispute settlement system, effective horizontal co-operation,
more effective decision-making, and strengthening the position of theWTO-bodies.
Still, even taking into account the deficiencies, the achievements of theWTO have
been impressive. It has allowedmembership of non-state actors and has been innov-
ative by introducing a dispute settlement system that works. It has given emerging
economies a chance to enter theworldmarket byoffering a frameworkandplatform
for negotiations. Membership of theWTOmakes a difference.
Trade liberalization is a complex process which triggers othermechanisms in in-
ternational economic relations. Competition policy, protection of labour rights and
38. Ibid., para. 254.
39. Ibid., para. 240.
40. Ibid., para. 243.
41. Ibid., para. 245.
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regulated monetary policies all matter in a fair and balanced world trading system.
Thereportdoesnotaddress these issuesandinthat sense ithasonly limitedcoverage.
This report is the beginning of a ongoing debate on the future of the world trading
system. However, before other areas are explored, questions need to be answered.
What are the real benefits of trade liberalization? If no satisfactory answers are
provided, a lack of legitimacywill eventuallymarginalize theWTO. In otherwords,
the benefits of liberalization, now and in the future, must be demonstrable. An-
other point is theWTO’s current legitimacy. The report even suggests improving its
democratic legitimacy by parliamentary involvement. Itmentions apropos a parlia-
mentary assembly as part of the WTO system. Unquestionably this ambitious idea
would be several steps ahead ofwhatmembers arewilling to accept, but it shows the
WTO,more than other IGOs, as open to creating a global constitutional framework.
The idea of a ‘constitutional’ WTO has gainedmuch attention among scholars.42
In its contribution to the debate on trade liberalization, the report focuses on
economic consequences but fails to recognize that diversity and identity must be
preserved.Globalizationandtrade liberalizationmeans that fromAlabamatoUlaan-
baatar Heinz ketchup and Heineken beer drives local producers from the market.
Many locally manufactured products have become collector’s items.43 More free
trade may also mean that scarce natural resources are easily exhausted because of
demand in the world markets. It is understandable that the report cannot rebut all
the arguments, but it wouldmake sense to think about globalization and prosperity
on the one hand and ways of preserving diversity and local identity on the other.
At least the report could have explained that trade liberalization on a global scale
is not an irreversible force but an idea developed as part of economic theory and
supported by a political elite.
A key problem of theWTO is the ineffective decision-making process caused by
its current institutional framework. Forpersuasive reasons the reportfindsabandon-
ing the consensus diplomacy to beundesirable, but it also recognizes that consensus
frustrates progress in the legislative process. Arguably progress in the Doha ne-
gotiations is unlikely when 148 members must reach consensus on proposals for
changing trade rules. Even an insignificantmember could produce an effective veto
if it has the stomach for it. Lack of progress in trade negotiations would eventually
marginalize the WTO; members will ignore it and seek to establish closer trade
relations with regional partners. Remedies for improving the decision-making pro-
cess include a distinction between procedural and substantive issues; only the latter
would require consensus. The report also suggests requiring members to invoke, in
writing, ‘a vital national interest’ when breaking the consensus.
Since the decision-making process is a major flaw in the WTO system, the re-
port should reflect a greater effort by the consultative board in giving direction for
42. For an attempt to define the constitutionalization of international trade law seeD. Z. Cass, ‘TheConstitution-
alizationof InternationalTradeLaw: JudicialNorm-Generationas theEngineofConstitutionalDevelopment
in International Trade’, (2001) 12 EJIL 39. For amore recent appraisal and literature onWTO constitutional-
ism see R. Howse and K. Nicolaidis, ‘Deliberately Democratizing Multilateral Organizations’, in M. Verweij
and T. Josling (eds.), ‘Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?’, (2003) 16
(1)Governance 73.
43. See, e.g., the iconic work of Naomi Klein,No Logo: No Space, No Choice, No Jobs (2002).
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institutional reform.Acloser look couldhavebeen takenat other economicorganiz-
ations, particularly the BrettonWoods institutions. An interesting option is a board
of executive directors, of limited membership (about 25) but representing all WTO
members. Thisbodymaycarryout tasks assigned to it ordelegatedby theMinisterial
Conference. Each directorwould represent a constituency of like-mindedmembers.
This would mean that members of one constituency would be forced to take a uni-
fied position, since its director could only speak with a single voice. Constituencies
could be arranged through regional co-operation, although this is not necessarily
a feasible approach. Alternatively, members sharing a common trade interest (agri-
cultural producers, emerging economies, oil-exporting members) could join forces.
Major trading partners (United States, European Union, China, Japan, India, Brazil)
could be given the right to appoint their own director. If decision-making by con-
sensus continues to be the rule, then there is no need to introduce a system of
weighted voting.44
The report’s finding that the result of co-operationwith other intergovernmental
organizations on the whole has been positive is not convincing. In the discourse
on theWTO–IMF relationship it should be recognized that trade liberalization and
monetary stability are closely connected and justify a more intensive co-ordination
between the IMF and the WTO. The report could have been more innovative in
discussing the IMF–WTO relationship, that is, the link between trade restrictions (a
WTO issue) and the need for macroeconomic adjustment when countries run into
balance of payments difficulties (an IMF issue).45
Many pressing questions remain. In the final analysis it is imperative that trade
diplomats produce effective rules for theWTO to adjust to a changing environment.
In which direction should the process of trade liberalization move?Will the global
system eventually giveway to regional arrangements? Should theWTO reflect only
core rules on trade liberalization and leave specific commitments to preferential
trade agreements? Is it feasible that theWTO oversees a system of preferential trade
arrangements? Will the Dispute Settlement Body be able to preserve its authority
and legitimacywhenmembers turn their backs on theWTO?
44. This is similar to the constituency structure of the BrettonWoods institutions that has successfully operated
since 1945. In this structure the largest fivemembers each appoints a representative (on the Executive Board
an executive director) and the rest of the members form voting groups and elect the other 20 executive
directors. By this arrangement all 184 IMF members are represented on an Executive Board of 25. There
is, however, one major formal difference with the WTO: the Bretton Woods institutions use a system of
weighted voting. However, in practice voting hardly ever takes place, something also stipulated in rule C-10
of the IMF Rules and Regulations: ‘The Chairman shall ordinarily ascertain the sense of ameeting in lieu of a
formal vote.’
45. If developing countries had unimpeded access to world markets, many would never see the IMF. The UN
Development Programme (UNDP), in its Poverty Report (2000), explains that developing countries pay a
high price for protectionism over domestic agricultural production: ‘Under the existing WTO agreement
on agriculture, countries are obliged to lower tariffs, convert quotas to tariffs and reduce subsidies to
their agricultural sectors. But developing countries argue that industrial countries have used both tariff
and non-tariff barriers to restrict access to their agricultural exports – leading to annual losses in ex-
port earnings of $700 billion. And industrial countries continue to charge higher tariffs on processed
than on non-processed foods, frustrating developing country efforts to add value to agricultural exports.’
www.undp.org/povertyreport/chapters/chap4.html (last accessed 7 July 2005).
